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Abstract
The Provability Logic and Proof-Theory of the system of Paraconsistent Arithmetic PRACI are presented.
PRACI is based on the paraconsistent predicate calculus CI corresponding to the C-system Ci introduced
by Carnielli et al. [7]. PRACI can support an inﬁnity of contradictions B ∧ ¬B without trivializing, but
reject identiﬁcations between diﬀerent numbers such as 0 = 1. In PRACI a new propositional connective
◦(.) is added, so that ◦A can be read as “A is consistent”. We obtain a system with a local selfreference, based
on the local consistency assertions ◦A, and a global selfeference, based statements involving PrPRACI (.) .
The fundamental relation PrT(#
◦B) → ¬PrT(#B) betweeen local and global consistency is investigated.
It states that in a paraconsistent setting, the provability of the non-trivialty of Arithmetic could be reduced
to that of some suitable local consistency assertions, so that we can speak of a possible weakened Hilbert’s
program.
Keywords: Paraconsistent Arithmetic, Provability Logic, Local and Global Selfreference, Weakened
Hilbert’s program.
1 Introduction
In this paper we explore Provability Logic and Proof-Theory of the system of Para-
consistent Arithmetic PRACI, based on the paraconsistent predicate calculus CI,
which extends the propositional C-system Ci introduced by Carnielli et al. [7].
As already pointed out in [1] for the presentation of the theory PCA, we propose
systems of Paraconsistent Arithmetic which are essentially new w.r.t. most of para-
consistent arithmetical theories existing in the preceding relevant literature. In our
thinking paraconsistent reasoning, intuitionistic reasoning and classical reasoning
can be compared as diﬀerent methods to investigate the same elementary math-
ematical objects: that is, we introduce a paraconsitent reasoning about standard
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numbers. Thus, the theories PCA and PRACI can support an inﬁnity of relevant
contradictions B ∧ ¬B without trivializing, but reject identiﬁcations between dif-
ferent numbers, such as 0 = 1 and so on. An interesting feature of the C-system
based arithmetical theories proposed here, is that a new propositional connective
◦(.) is added, expressing a notion of consistency referred to a particular formula,
so that ◦A can be read as “A is consistent”. PRACI exhaustively formalizes the
properties of local consitency assertions. Thus, by further introducing the global
(i.e. referred to a system) canonical provability predicate PrPRACI (.) , we obtain a
system where two kinds of selreference are possible: a local selfreference, based on
the local consistency assertions ◦A, and a global selfeference, based on the provabil-
ity logic statements involving PrPRACI (.) . In the paper the free cut-elimination
and paraconsistency properties of PRACI are presented (Sections 3 and 4), the
peculiar features of PRACI-Provability Logic are illustrated (Section 5), the in-
tensional meaning of the paraconsistent negation is discussed (Section 5), and the
fundamental relation betweeen local and global consistency is investigated (Section
6). That is, starting from the result <<  PrCI(#
◦B) → ¬PrCI(#B) is PRACI-
provable for each sentence B which has not the form ◦F >> (Theorem 6.5), a kind of
weakened Hilbert’s program can be suggested. Indeed, some weaker versions of the
previous implication, referred to PRACI, i.e. including the predicate PrPRACI(.)
and not symply PrCI(.), are PRACI-provable. Therefore, in a paraconsistent set-
ting, the provability of the non-trivialty (which corresponds to classical consistency)
of Arithmetic could be reduced to that of some suitable local consistency assertions.
Thus, very elementary and constructive extensions of PRACI, with the same in-
duction rule and withoud adding mathematical information, could prove the non
triviality of PRACI.
2 The paraconsistent sequent predicate calculus CI
In Benassi-Gentilini [1] the sequent version BC of the system bC is presented.
bC is the basic system of the hierarchy of paraconsistent C-systems, introduced by
Carnielli, Marcos and other authors [7,8,9,10,11,12], whose language is the extension
of the classical one through a monadic propositional connective ◦(.),which plays an
essential role in the introduction of the paraconsistent negation. As we shall see,
both ◦(.) and the propositional negation ¬ result as intensional logical operators.
The intended meaning of ◦B is “B is consistent ” that is “ <<B and not B>> does
not hold”. Thus, ◦B is a kind of formal translation of a metatheoretic statement, as
for the provability predicate PrT(.) happens. We call the formulas of the form
◦B
local consistency assertions. The C-system Ci is the bC-extension that explicitly
expresses the local consistency properties: indeed, bC cannot prove theorems of
the form ◦B, while Ci has a relevant class of such theorems. ◦B is neither bC- nor
Ci-equivalent to ¬(B ∧ ¬B). We present here the sequent version CI of Ci. We
recall that (see [5,23,14]) a sequent S is an expression of the form X  Y where X
and Y are ﬁnite (possibly empty) sets of formulas. X is called the antecedent of S,
Y the succedent of S. We will use the symbols X,Y,Λ,Γ, . . . as meta-expressions
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for sets of formulas, A,B,C,D, . . . for formulas. The intended meaning of a sequent
A1, A2, . . . , An  B1, B2, . . . , Bm is ∧iAi −→ ∨jBj and such equivalence holds both
in a classical and in a paraconsistent setting. Given a rule
S1...Sn
S
, the sequents
S1, ..., Sn are the premises of the rule, the sequent S is the conclusion of the rule.
The proofs are trees, whose leaves are axioms, and whose branches are formed by
sequent rules. The writing Λ,Γ stands for Λ ∪ Γ.
We say that a sequent formulated system or theory trivializes (or is trivial) if
and only if it proves each sequent of the form  A. A BC- or CI-based system
is trivial if and only if it proves the empty sequent  . A system T is negation
consistent if T cannot prove any formula of the form B ∧ ¬B. We recall that a
formula A is in prenex form if A is Q1....QnB where each Qj ∈ {∀xj,∃xj}j=1,...,n
and B is quantiﬁer-free; in general, any formula F is not CI-equivalent to a formula
D in prenex form, since the interdeﬁnability of quantiﬁers does not hold in the
paraconsistent setting presented here. In writing formulas we adopt the convention
that ∨,∧,¬ link more than→, and that → links more than ↔ . The sequent system
BC is given by (see also [1,12]):
BC−Axioms: A  A
BC−Positive propositional logical rules:
B,Γ  Δ
A ∧B,Γ  Δ
∧ −L
B,Γ  Δ
B ∧A,Γ  Δ
∧ −L
Γ  Δ, A Λ  X,B
Γ,Λ  Δ,X,A ∧B
∧ −R
Γ  Δ, A
Γ  Δ, A ∨B
∨ −R
Γ  Δ, A
Γ  Δ, B ∨A
∨ −R
A,Γ  Δ B,Λ  X
A ∨B,Γ,Λ  Δ,X
∨ −L
A,Γ  Δ, B
Γ  Δ, A→ B
−→ −R
Γ  Δ, AB,Λ  X
A→ B,Γ,Λ  Δ,X
−→ −L
BC−Negation rules:
A,Γ  Δ
¬¬A,Γ  Δ
¬ − L1
◦A,Γ  Δ, A
◦A,¬A,Γ  Δ
¬− L3
A,Γ  Δ
Γ  Δ,¬A
¬ −R
We call the formula ◦A in the rule ¬− L3 constraint formula of the rule.
BC−Quantiﬁer rules:
[t/x]A,Γ  Δ
∀xA,Γ  Δ
∀ − L
Γ  Δ, [b/x]A
Γ  Δ,∀xA
∀ −R
[b/x]A,Γ  Δ
∃xA,Γ  Δ
∃ − L
Γ  Δ, [t/x]A
Γ  Δ,∃xA
∃ −R
where t is an arbitrary term and b is a free variable which does not occur in
Γ,Δ. Moreover, t may be not fully quantiﬁed while b must be uniformly replaced
by x (see [23]).
BC−Structural rules:
Weakening rules:
Γ  Δ
Γ  Δ, A
W −R
Γ  Δ
A,Γ  Δ
W − L; Cut rule:
Γ  Δ, AA,Λ  X
Γ,Λ  Δ,X
Cut
The system CI is given by adding to BC the following proper CI-rules:
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Γ  Δ, ◦A
¬◦A,Γ  Δ
¬ − L4
A ∧ ¬A,Γ  Δ
Γ  Δ, ◦A
RCi
In the rule RCi the formula A ∧ ¬A in the premise antecedent is the
RCi−auxiliary formula, the formula ◦A in the conclusion succedent is the
RCi−principal formula. Note that system CI only has a rule introducing the con-
nective ◦(.). Moreover, the classical predicate calculus LK [19,23] can be obtained
from BC by replacing the pair ¬ − L3, ¬ − L1, with the rule:
Γ  Δ, A
¬A,Γ  Δ
¬ − L2.
Theorem 2.1 The system CI admits of cut-elimination.
For the proof see [13].
It must be stressed that CI cannot deﬁne the connective ◦(.). In particular, the
following sequents are CI-provable:  ◦B → ¬(B ∧ ¬B) ,  ¬◦B ↔ B ∧ ¬B . But
 ¬(B ∧ ¬B) → ◦B is not CI-provable.
3 Paraconsistent Arithmetic with a local consistency
operator
The system of CI-based Paraconsistent Recursive Arithmetic PRACI is so deﬁned.
The language of PRACI is that of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA, plus the
monadic propositional connective ◦(.) of the C-systems. For the proof theory of
classical Arithmetic we refer to [4,6,17,19,23].
We choose a version of PRA with the only predicate = (., .), the individual
constant 0, symbols for numerals, and a function letter for each primitive recursive
function. We assume as identiﬁed the writings = (t, s) and t = s. All the primitive
recursive predicates R diﬀerent from = (., .) are expressed by their characteristic
function XR, and XR(t1, ..., tn) = 1 means that R(t1, ..., tn) holds, XR(t1, ..., tn) = 0
means that R(t1, ..., tn) does not hold. Moreover, we establish that each proper
axiom set we shall present in this work is closed under term substitution.
PRACI is given by the system CI plus the set AxPRACI of proper axioms
and the rule Ind.
AxPRACI is the following axiom set:
1) Arithmetical axioms deﬁning primitive recursive function (in the following
sequents all the explicitly indicated variables xi, yj, are free):
1j)Deﬁnitions of the basic recursive functions (zero function, successor function,
projection function):
 Zk (x1, ..., xk) = 0 for each k ≥ 1 (Zk zero function);
S (x) = 0  (S successor function);
S(x) = S(y)  x = y
 P ki (x1, ..., xk) = xi for each k ≥ 1 ,i ≤ k (P
k
i projection function);
1jj) Composition schema:
 f (x1, ..., xm) = h (g1 (x1, ..., xm) , ..., gm (x1, ..., xm))
where g1, ...., gm are n-ary function letters and h is a m-ary function letter.
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1jjj) Recursion schema :
 f (x1, ..., xn, 0) = g (x1, ..., xn)
 f (x1, ..., xn, S (y)) = h (x1, ..., xn, y, f (x1, ..., xn, y))
where g is a n-ary function letter and h is a n+ 1-ary function letter.
2)Equality axioms:
 x = x
x1 = y1, ..., xn = yn  f (x1, ..., xn) = f (y1, ..., yn)
x1 = y1, x2 = y2, x1 = x2  y1 = y2
Convention:
for each natural number m we write m for the term S...S(0), with m occurences
of S on the left. The terms of the form m are called numerals. We will brieﬂy write
1, 2, ...,for numerals, each time no confusion arises.
The induction rule Ind of PRACI has the following form:
F (x) ,X  Y, F (S (x))
F (0) ,X  Y, F (t)
Ind
where F (x) is an atomic formula; the free variable x, called the eigenvariable of the
rule, does not occur in X,Y, t ; t is an arbitrary term which we say introduced by
Ind; F (0) , F (t) are the principal formulas of Ind; F (x), F (S (x)) are the auxiliary
formulas of Ind.
Note that the usual deﬁnitions by recursion of sum and product are included
in the schemata of AxPRACI Moreover, the axiom S (x) = 0  gives rise to
a set of bottom particles (see [9]) for PRACI, so that any formula of the form
S(t) = 0 trivializes PRACI. We note that the deduction apparatus of classical
Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA is given by the classical predicate calculus
LK plus AxPRACI and the rule Ind. Classical full Arithmetic PA is the ex-
tension of PRA by induction rules admitting arbitrary induction formulas, and
analogously is deﬁned the CI-based Full Paraconsistent Arithmetic PACI. Note
that the PRACI-language strictly includes the PRA-language due to the occur-
rence of the connective ◦(.). The system of Paraconsistent Recursive Arithmetic
PCA introduced in [1] is the subsystem of PRACI obtained by restricting CI to
BC. We recall that a term t of the PRACI-language is called a ground term if no
variables occur in it. We write Δ0 for the class of primitive recursive relations, Σ1
for the class of formulas ∃xA(x) with A ∈ Δ0,Π1 for the class of formulas ¬A with
A ∈ Σ1 (see also [6,22]). Note however that, e.g., the class Π1 is not the same as
in the classical case since the translation into a prenex form fails in PRACI. We
will write N for the standard model of PRA and N for the natural number set.
As usual, at the metatheoretic level of the discourse, we assume the consistency of
classical Arithmetic.
In order to study arithmetical theories T of the form W+ AxT + Ind, AxT
including AxPRACI, where W ∈ {LK,BC,CI}, it is important to establish
whether the proofs in T admits of the elimination of some class of cut inferences. In
[1] we have already considered the case with W ≡ BC. According to the canonical
exposition of Buss [5], p 43, we employ the notion of free cut :
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Deﬁnition 3.1 Let P be a proof in W+AxT+ Ind,W ∈ {LK,BC,CI} . We say
that a formula occurrence B in P is anchored if B is the direct descendant either of
a formula occurring in an initial sequent belonging to AxT or of a principal formula
of an induction rule. A cut inference in P is called a free cut if either : i) the cut
formula is not atomic and both the cut formula occurrences in the premises are not
anchored, or ii) at least one cut formula occurrence in the premises is not anchored
and is introduced in P by weakenings or logical axioms only. A cut inference which
is not free is said to be anchored.
In Buss [5], pp. 43-47, the following result is proven:
Theorem 3.2 (Classical free-cut elimination theorem) Let T ≡ LK+AxT+ Ind,
be a theory of arithmetic with AxT closed under term substitution. Then T admits
of free-cut elimination.
The following is a classical consequence of the theorem mentioned above:
Proposition 3.3 Cut-elimination of non atomic cuts holds in PRA.
The extension of the free-cut elimination theorem to the system PRACI holds:
Lemma 3.4 Let U ≡ CI+AxV with AxV closed under term substitution. Then
U admits of free-cut elimination.
Theorem 3.5 (Free-cut elimination theorem) Let T ≡ CI+AxT+Ind be a theory
of arithmetic with AxT closed under term substitution. Then T admits of the
elimination of free cuts.
For the sake of brevity we cannot present the proofs here.
Corollary 3.6 Cut-elimination of non atomic cuts holds in PRACI.
Deﬁnition 3.7 Let T ≡ U+AxT, U ∈ {PRA,PCA,PRACI}, AxT possibly
empty axiom set. Then a proof P in T is called normal if free cuts do not occur
in P.
Lemma 3.8 Let X  Y be a sequent such that X and Y are not both empty and
include at most atomic formulas. Then X  Y is PRACI-provable if and only if
it is PRA-provable.
Proof. If X  Y is PRACI-provable, then, it admits of a normal PRACI-proof
Q in which only atomic formulas occur. Therefore, Q is a PRA-proof too. On
the other hand, if X  Y is PRA-provable it admits of a normal PRA-proof P in
which only atomic formulas occur, and P is also a PRACI-proof. 
Let’s conclude the section by checking the non triviality and the negation con-
sistency of PRACI:
Deﬁnition 3.9 We call reduced translation of a PRACI-formula B into PRA the
formula B∗ obtained from B by replacing each occurrence of a B-subformula of the
form ◦F with ¬(F ∧ ¬F ). We call reduced PRA-translation of a PRACI-tree Q
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the tree Q∗ in the conservative extension PRACI + ¬ − L1 obtained from Q by
replacing each formula with its reduced translation.
Proposition 3.10 PRACI is non trivial and negation consistent.
Proof. From a PRACI-proof tree Q of the empty sequent we would obtain, by the
reduced PRA-translation, a proof tree Q* of the empty sequent in PRA+¬−L1:
indeed each RCi instance is translated into a ¬−R rule. But this is absurd under
our assumptions. 
We remark that, through the reduced translation, we also obtain a kind of
interpetation of PRACI into the standard model N. However this is not a proper
semantics for PRACI, which, for example, must falsify an inﬁnity of formulas
¬(B ∧ ¬B) . PRACI-semantics could be deﬁned as an extension of the semantics
for Ci presented in [7], but a diﬀerent approach is proposed in [13].
4 Paraconsistency properties of PRACI
No contradiction in the classical language is either proved or rejected by BC or CI.
However, in the arithmetical systems PCA and PRACI we have a more complex
situation since, as already discussed in [1], PCA rejects the identiﬁcations between
diﬀerent numbers. Since this is guaranteed by the axiom S (x) = 0 , PRACI too
rejects the identiﬁcation between diﬀerent numbers. We call numerical absurdity
any atomic formula s = t where s and t are ground terms which are respectively
PRACI-provably equal to m and n, with m,n diﬀerent numerals. Thus PRACI
is trivialized by each sequent  s = t, where s = t is any numerical absurdity, and
furthermore by a lot of classical contradictions involving numerical absurdities:
Proposition 4.1 PRACI is trivialized by sequents of the form  (m = n)∧¬(m =
n), where m = n is a numerical absurdity and, moreover, by an inﬁnity of sequents
of the form  (A ∧ ¬A), where only the classical connectives at most occur in A.
Theorem 4.2 Let  ¬(A ∧ ¬A) be a PRACI-provable sequent such that in A
classical connectives at most occur, through a normal proof Q. Then ¬(A ∧ ¬A)
must be a descendant in Q of a sequent s = t  such that s = t has at least one
instance which is a numerical absurdity, and atomic formulas having numerical
absurdities as instances necessarily occur in A.
The proofs are similar to that of the analogous theses for PCA (see [1]). Of
course, PRACI maintains many relevant paraconsistency properties already owned
by PCA:
Theorem 4.3 Sequents of the form  (m = m) ∧ ¬(m = m), m any numeral, do
not trivialize PRACI.
Proposition 4.4 Sequents of the form  ¬(t = t → t = t), t any term, do not
trivialize PRACI.
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Theorem 4.5 Sequents of the form  PrV(#A∧¬A)∧¬PrV(#A∧¬A) , where V is
any non trivial recursively axiomatized system extending PRACI, do not trivialize
PRACI.
Proposition 4.6 There is a denumerable inﬁnity of formulas A such that PRACI
does not prove any sequent of the form  ¬(A ∧ ¬A).
For the sake of brevity we do not present the proofs of the theses above. The
reader can see the similar proofs of the corresponding results for PCA in [1]. How-
ever, as expected, the paraconsistency properties of PRACI cannot be the same
as for PCA, for example:
Proposition 4.7 Each sequent of the forms  ◦F ∧ ¬◦F or ◦◦F  trivializes
PRACI and does not trivialize PCA.
Proof. Consider the following PRACI-proof:
◦F  ◦F
◦F,¬◦F 
◦F ∧ ¬◦F 
. As to the second part
of the thesis, it follows from the properties of normal proofs in PCA. 
5 Global Selfreference and Provability Logic of PRACI
In [1] we have already illustrated the formalization of metatheory inside PCA.
As to the basic notions and properties the extension to PRACI is straightfor-
ward.The writing #E stands for the go¨del-number of any expression E of the
PCA-language. Therefore, we can deﬁne a binary primitive recursive predicate
ProvPRACI(., .) such that ProvPRACI(m,n) holds iﬀ m is the go¨del-number of
a PRACI- proof of the sentence with go¨del-number n. We recall that in our
language each primitive recursive predicate R is expressed by the characteristic
function XR, so that we employ the fuction XPr ov−PRACI, and ProvPRACI(m,n)
corresponds to XPr ov−PRACI(m,n) = 1 in the PRACI-language. However, we
will brieﬂy write ProvPRACI(m,n) for XPr ov−PRACI(m,n) = 1, and so on. The
formula ∃yXPr ov−PRACI(y,#B) = 1 means “the sentence B is PRACI-provable”
and we also write it as PrPRACI (#B).
2 In general if K is a recursive relation be-
tween terms t1, ..., tn we formally express it by XK(t1, ..., tn) = 1, XK characteristic
function, and its recursive complementary relation by XK(r1, ..., rn) = 0: note that
we do not establish in PRACI any link between XK(r1, ..., rn) = 0 and the formula
¬(XK(r1, ..., rn) = 1), since, as happens for PCA, the logical PRACI-negation is
not the boolean negation. Conversely, in the classical PRA the logical negation is
boolean. PrPRACI (·) is the non recursive Σ1-provability predicate of PRACI. We
recall that a slightly diﬀerent canonical predicate PrPRACI[.] is deﬁnable, such that
if B is any open formula with free variables x, y, ..., then PrPRACI[#B] has the same
x, y, ...as free variables and means “the formula B is PCA-provable”; PrPRACI[#B]
coincides with PrPRACI (#B) if B is closed. We brieﬂy write PrPRACI (#B) even
if B is open, with the convention that PrPRACI (#B) has the same free variables
2 As to the classical Provability Logic see [2,3,21]. For a possible conjectural approach see [18]. For the
links with modal logic see [14,15,16,20,22].
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as B. We extend in a straightforward way the godelization to sequents, and so
PrPRACI (#X  Y ) means “sequent X  Y is PRACI-provable” and it is evident,
since we are working with sequent formulated systems, that PrPRACI (#B) has
the same meaning as PrPRACI (#  B). For each recursively axiomatized theory T
of the form PRACI+AxT, AxT proper axiom set, we can analogously deﬁne a
provability predicate PrT (.) for T.
As to the PRACI-representation of the non triviality of any paraconsistent rec.
axiom. system T extending PRACI, we remark that the situation is diﬀerent with
respect to the PRA-representation of the consistentcy of any classical rec. axiom.
system U extending PRA. In the classical case we have an inﬁnity of diﬀerent
formulas stating the consistency of U, that are all PRA-equivalent to ¬PrU (# ),
which we also write Con(U). In the paraconsistent case, if S and F are two diﬀerent
non PRACI-provable sequents or formulas, then both ¬PrT (#S) and ¬PrT (#F )
express the non-triviality of T, but they are not PRACI-equivalent, and this holds
even if S and F are PRACI-equivalent. Moreover, observe that ¬PrT (#F ) is a
Π1-formula in our paraconsistent sense, i.e. it cannot be equivalently written in the
form ∀xA(x). We call global selfrefence sentences of PRACI those including also
subformulas of the form PrT (#S) , with T any PRACI-extension.
The deep diﬀerence between paraconsitent and classical selfreference is an-
nounced by the following non-transparency results:
Proposition 5.1 Let B(z) be any formula in which the free variable z occurs; then
the sequent r = t, B(r)  B(t) is in general not PRACI-provable, so that PRACI
is not transparent.
The proof is similar to that for PCA (see [1]). An elementary example is the
PRACI-unprovability of sequents of the form r = t,¬(f(r) = k)  ¬(f(t) = k),
with r, t, k suitable terms, f any unary function letter.
Also the local consistency connective ◦(.) has a non transparent behaviour, that
is:
Proposition 5.2 Sequents of the form x = y, ◦A(x)  ◦A(y), such that x, y are
diﬀerent free variables and A(z) is any atomic formula with z free variable, are in
general not PRACI-provable.
Proof. Suppose ad absurdum that x = y, ◦(Z(x) = 0)  ◦(Z(y) = 0) is the root of
a normal PRACI-proof Q, where Z is the zero-function. By free-cut elimination
property, by recalling that all non-logical axioms of PRACI are sequents of atomic
formulas, and that the PRACI-induction acts on atomic formulas only, each ances-
tor in Q of ◦(Z(x) = 0) in the antecedent must be introduced by weakenings only,
and never is the constraint formula of a ¬ − L3 rule . If we delete such wakenings,
and also delete weakenings introducing atomic formulas, in the most general case we
get a normal proof Q’ of x = y  ◦(Z(y) = 0). We assume that in Q and Q’ all the
atomic cuts occur above any propositional rule, so that the premise of the Q’-root is,
in the most general case, a RCi−premise of the form x = y, Z(y) = 0 ∧ ¬Z(y) = 0
 . Then, by the free-cut elimination, we have that x = y, Z(y) = 0  must be
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provable. Since  Z(y) = 0 is a PRACI-axiom, we get x = y  as a theorem,
which is absurd. 
The deﬁnitive arguments to conclude that ¬ and ◦(.) are in PRACI intensional
connectives will be given in the sequel through provability logic statements. First,
we mention what standard provabilty logic statements are preserved in PRACI:
Proposition 5.3 If PRACI proves  B, then PRACI proves  PrPRACI (#B).
Moreover, the following sequents are PRACI -provable: (D1)
PrPRACI (#A→ B)  PrPRACI (#A) → PrPRACI (#B) ; (D2)
PrPRACI (#A→ B) ∧ PrPRACI (#A)  PrPRACI (#B) ; (D3) 
PrPRACI (#A ∧B) ↔ PrPRACI (#A) ∧ PrPRACI (#B) ; (D4)PrPRACI (#B) 
PrPRACI (#PrPRACI (#B)).
Furthermore, it must be remarked that the proof-strength ofPRACI is relevant,
for example:
Theorem 5.4 PRACI proves the consistency (non triviality) of each consistent
(non trivial) ﬁnitely axiomatized subsystem of PRA (of PRACI).
Proof. Let V be any ﬁnitely axiomatized subsystem as mentioned in the thesis. By
fundamental results of classical proof-theory (see [19]) we have that PRA proves
 ¬PrV (# ) and then PrV (# )  . By the predicate calculus LK, the atomic
sequent ProvV(a,# )  , a free variable, is PRA-provable. Then, by Lemma 3.8,
it is PRACI-provable too. 
Corollary 5.5 Let V be any ﬁnitely axiomatized subsystem of PRA or PRACI.
Then PRACI proves  ◦ PrV (# ) .
Notwithstanding such meaningful proof power, the main tool of classical Prov-
ability Logic fails in PRACI. We recall that Go¨del’s Diagonal Lemma for PRA
(see e.g. [21,22]) states that:
Lemma 5.6 (Classical Diagonal Lemma) Let A(u) be a PRA-formula in which
the free variable u occurs. Then there is a formula B such that A(#B) ↔ B is
PRA-provable. Moreover, A(#B) and B have exactly the same free variables.
We have that:
Theorem 5.7 Classical Diagonal Lemma does not hold for PRACI.
Theorem 5.8 (Paraconsistent diagonal lemma for PRACI) Let A(u) be a
PRACI-formula in which the free variable u occurs. Then there are a formula
B and a ﬁnite set {◦Ds}s=1,...,d of local consistency assertions such that:
i)the sequent {(∀xj)
◦Ds}s=1,...,d  A(#B)↔ B is PRACI-provable;
ii) A(#B) and B have exactly the same free-variable set V and the free variables
occurring in {(∀xj)
◦Ds}s=1,...,d belong to V ;
iii) each formula Ds can be obtained by term renaming from a proper subformula
Gs of A(u) such that Gs has not the form
◦F and ¬Gs too is an A(u)-subformula.
P. Gentilini / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 169 (2007) 73–8682
The classical form of diagonal lemma can be re-obtained in PRACI for a sig-
niﬁcant particular case, due to the PRACI- provability of some classes of local
consistency assertions:
Proposition 5.9 Let A(u) be a PRACI-formula in which the free variable u oc-
curs, such that each negated A(u)−subformula has the form ¬◦G. Then the thesis
of the Diagonal Lemma holds in PRACI for A in the classical way.
The lack of diagonal lemma in its standard form shows that the proofs of Go¨del’s
theorem cannot be the same as in the classical case. On the other hand, the an-
tecedent of Paraconsistent Diagonal Lemma shows the relevant role of local consis-
tency assertions in providing new formulations of important principles of classical
selfreference.
We know that in the classical case A  PrPRA (#A) is PRA-provable for each
A which is a Σ1−formula (see [2,22]). In the paracosistent case such property in
general does not hold:
Proposition 5.10 The sequent B  PrPRACI (#B) is in general not PRACI-
provable for any arbitrary quantiﬁer free formula B; in particular, if A is any
quantiﬁer free non negated formula such that  ¬A is not PRACI-provable, then
¬A  PrPRACI (#¬A) is not PRACI-provable.
Proposition 5.11 If ◦B is not a PRACI−theorem, then ◦B  PrPRACI (#
◦B)
is not PRACI-provable.
Proof. Assume ad absurdum that a normal PRACI-proof Q of ◦B 
PrPRACI (#
◦B) exists. By free-cut elimination, ◦B in the antecedent can be
introduced in Q by weakenings only, and no ancestor of it can be the con-
straint formula of a ¬ − L3 rule. If we delete such weakenings we have that
 PrPRACI (#
◦B) is provable. Then, since PRACI is not trivial, a normal proof
P of  PrPRACI (#
◦B) exists, such that the root succedent is introduced in P also
by a ∃-R inference having the premise of the form:  XPr ov−PRACI(t1,#
◦B) =
1, ....,XPr ov−PRACI(tm,#
◦B) = 1, with t1, ..., tm, closed terms, m ≥ 1. But, by
hypotheses, each formula in such premise is a false ground recursive relation, and
the normal proof of such premise is a PRA-proofs too. This is absurd, since PRA
does not prove any disjunction of false ground recursive relations. 
Therefore, the PRACI-logical negation ¬ anf the local consistency connective
◦(.) are intensional, and, moreover, cannot be expressed through Σ1-formulas. Thus,
for example, ¬1 = 1  PrPRACI(#¬1 = 1) and
◦(1 = 1)  PrPRACI(#
◦(1 = 1)) are
not PRACI-provable. Observe however that for the boolean negation of a recursive
relation the property is preserved , that is X=(x, y) = 0  PrPRACI(#X=(x, y) =
0), x, y, free variables, is PRACI-provable.
We wish to emphasize the fact that the sentences expressing the non triviality
of a PRACI-based system T are in general not PRACI-equivalent. In particular:
Proposition 5.12 Let B any non T-provable sentence of a paraconsistent system
T ≡ PRACI +AxT whose non-triviality is not PRA-provable. Then neither
P. Gentilini / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 169 (2007) 73–86 83
¬PrT(# )  ¬PrT(#B) nor ¬PrT(#B)  ¬PrT(# ) are PRACI-provable.
Proof. First, we establish that, if S is any nonT-provable sequent, then PrT(#S) 
is not PRACI-provable. Indeed, if so it is we would have, by predicate calculus
CI, ProvT(a,#S)  in PRACI and then, by Lemma 3.8, ProvT(a,#S)  should
be PRA-provable, against the hypotheses. Thus, since  ¬PrT(#S) cannot be
PRACI-provable, the thesis follows from free-cut elimination. 
Remark that the non-triviality statements mentioned above do not play equiva-
lent roles w.r.t. classical PRA. For example, ¬PrPRACI(# )↔ ¬PrPRA(# ) is
PRA-provable, but ¬PrPRACI(#¬(1 = 1∧¬1 = 1)) → ¬PrPRA(#¬(1 = 1∧¬1 =
1)) is false in the standard model N.
6 Relations between local and global consistency in
PRACI-Provability Logic
Proposition 6.1 The schema ◦A→ A makes PRACI trivial.
Proof. Consider any formula B which has not the form ◦F an such that B  is
PRACI-provable. Then, by ∧−R we get B ∧ ¬B  from which, by RCi, we have
 ◦B. Thus, from the schema-instance ◦B → B we get  B, that with B  produces
the empty sequent. 
Proposition 6.2 Let B any sentence such that B  PrPRACI(#B) is PRACI-
provable. Then the foollwing sequents are PRACI-provable: i)  PrPRACI(#B) ∨
◦B and ii)  ¬◦B → PrPRACI(#B).
Proof. Both theses follow from the application of the proper PRACI rules RCi
and ¬ − L4. 
Note that the propositions above do not hold for PCA.
Lemma 6.3 Assume that the formula B is not a negated formula and has not the
form ◦F. Then, if CI proves  ◦B, the formula B is not CI-provable.
Proof. By the cut elimination for CI-proofs, the proof Q of ◦B must have a RCi
as end-rule, with premise B ∧ ¬B  . By cut elimination, this implies that either
B  or ¬B  is CI-provable. The latter case would be absurd, by the hypotheses
on B and by cut elimination. Then, B  is CI-provable. Therefore, if  B would
be CI-provable we obtain the empty sequent, against the cut-elimination for CI.
If cut − el(CI) is the formula representing in the PRA-language the cut-
elimiantion property of CI, we have:
Lemma 6.4 The following sequents are both PRA- and PRACI-provable: i) 
cut − el(CI); ii)  ¬PrCI(# ).
Note that for CI the non triviality is a straightforward consequence of cut-
elimination. Conversely, it is obvious that the stated free-cut elimination for PRA
and PRACI does not imply their consistency or non-triviality.
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Theorem 6.5 (Fundamental relation between local and global consistency) The
proof of Lemma 6.3 can be translated into PRA and PRACI so that :
 PrCI(#
◦B)→ ¬PrCI(#B)
is PRACI-provable for each sentence B which has not the form ◦F.
Proof. The starting point is the PRA-provability of  PrCI(#
◦B)→ ¬PrCI(#B),
due to the standard representation power of PRA (see [21,22]). Then, it can be
shown that the PRA-proof must also be a PRACI-proof. 
The fundamental relation connects the provability of a local consistency asser-
tion with the global non triviality of the system. An important fact is that the
fundamental relation is true for PRACI too:
Lemma 6.6 Assume that the formula B has not the form ◦F , and that PRACI
does not prove the empty sequent. Then, if PRACI proves  ◦B, the formula B is
not PRACI -provable.
Proof. Without any loss of generality we can suppose that in the normal proof
Q of  ◦B all atomic cuts occur above each logical rule. Then, recalling that ◦B
cannot be introduced in Q by Induction rules, we proceed as in the proof of Lemma
6.3, by employing free-cut elimination. 
The main goal is to select a minimal constructive PRACI-extension that proves
the fundamental relation for PRACI.
Let free−cut−el(PRACI) be the formula representing the free-cut elimination
property for PRACI. Then we have the following preliminary fact:
Proposition 6.7 Assume that the formula B has not the form ◦F , and that
PRACI does not prove the empty sequent. Then the proof of Lemma 6.6 can
be translated into PRA and PRACI so that :
free− cut− el(PRACI) ∧ ◦ PrPRACI(# ) ∧ ¬PrPRACI(# 
) ∧ PrPRACI(#
◦B)  ¬PrPRACI(#B)
is PRACI-provable.
A weakened Hilbert’s program could be so declared: to ﬁnd a very weak and
constructive PRACI-extension W such that the fundamental relation for PRACI,
i.e. the sequent PrPRACI(#
◦B)  ¬PrPRACI(#B), is W-provable. Thus, the
problem of proving the non triviality ofPRACI (i.e a global selfreference statement)
could be reduced to the provability of suitable local consistency assertions−that is,
PRACI almost would establish its own non triviality. In essence, the conjecture
is the following: the CI-based paraconsistent arithmetical systems have, w.r.t non-
triviality, more constructive and eﬃcient proof capabilities than that owned by
classical atithmetical systems w.r.t. consistency.
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